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The ‘disconnected capitalism’ thesis constructs an argument that structural
tendencies within capital markets disrupt established patterns of relations between
employers and labour. This article develops this argument by conceptualizing how
the ‘private-equity business model’ (PEBM) further diffuses these connections and
trends. This diffusion is so extensive that the interests of owners are now paramount
in all types of business system to the relative exclusion of other stakeholders. The
article defines and explains the term ‘PEBM’ and identifies the theoretical impor-
tance of management in managerial capitalism. The article then goes on to outline
how the PEBM disconnects the evaluation of institutional capability and managerial
discretion at firm level from the economics of information and direct ownership
interests at business system level.
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Introduction
‘Disconnected capitalism’ is a thesis developed by Thompson (2003) in thisjournal, to argue that structural tendencies within capital markets dis-rupt established patterns of relations between employers and labour in
the American and British business system. Financial de-regulation together
with a globalization of markets has combined with the apparent dominance of a
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business model centred on delivering shareholder value in capital markets. It
is the connections between these trends – the short-term imperative to generate
revenue, new models of competitiveness that emphasize investor returns and a
disdain for the interests of the customer, the employee and the exchequer – that
have the effect of disconnecting more established circuits of capital which are
embedded in national business systems. At this theoretical level Thompson
(2003: 363–7) concluded that much leading edge theory and associated best
practice, in particular literature sets (for example, strategic HRM and high per-
formance work systems) are likely to be rendered unsustainable as employers
become unable to maintain their side of the bargain.
This article develops the argument by theorizing how the ‘private-equity
business model’ (PEBM) further diffuses the connections within this trend to
assert that investor-owner interests are of growing prominence to the relative
exclusion of other stakeholders. Thus, the article seeks to open out underdevel-
oped dimensions of the disconnected capitalism thesis by focusing on particular
dynamics within the circuits of capital in an increasingly financialized economy
and their potential impacts on employment relations within national business
systems. The first half of the article details a theoretical outline of the PEBM and
its impact on the relative theoretical importance of managers and owners. The
second half of the article outlines the actual and potential consequences of the
PEBM for employment relations at system level and at firm level by identifying
three disconnects, which to paraphrase Thompson (2003: 366) – ‘make it more
difficult for employers to keep their side of the bargain’, even if they want to.
The private-equity business model
Private equity is a pool of capital raised and managed for the specific purpose
of investing directly in companies. A private-equity fund is actively managed by
a plc fund management company or a limited partnership which may control
numerous funds. Limited partnerships are the favoured vehicle for the PEBM
for two reasons. Firstly, they have no legal personality yet individual partners
operate collectively and secondly, fund managers (managing partners) and
investors (limited partners) are taxed as individuals, therefore the partnership
itself has no tax liability. The sector is broad in scope and includes venture cap-
ital funds which are a form of private-equity capital typically provided by pro-
fessional institutionally backed outside investors who support the growth of
new businesses. In addition to venture capital and mid-market private-equity
funds, larger, multinational private-equity funds, acquire plc firms or divisions
of plc firms by buying a controlling percentage of the shares which are listed on
a public stock market. Once a fund has control of all the shares in a portfolio
company the fund becomes the single shareholder and the firm is no longer a
publicly traded plc company. This is what is referred to as the private-equity
business model. So venture capital, mid-market buyout specialists and private
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equity are different fractions of capital, but what they do have in common is
the manner in which funds have been raised – on private rather than public
markets. The logic behind private equity and the broader umbrella model of
shareholder capitalism is a contractual approach to business which sees a firm
as a bundle of assets that can be managed on a contractual and transactional
basis. The ultimate purpose is to generate cash flow and profits over short-term
time horizons by financial and organizational manipulation. So while private-
equity funds (as a fraction of capital), may be long-term investors, portfolio
firms are viewed largely as short-term investments from which significant
value can be extracted.
Theoretically, the diffusion of private equity as a driver of investor and
shareholder value lies within corporate finance as an academic discipline and the
associated theory of efficient capital markets (Jensen, 2007; Jensen and Murphy,
2009). The theory contains an efficient-contracting orientation to the firm, that
is (capital) markets allocate resources to investments that secure the highest
returns. Jensen and Murphy (2009) argue that in plc firms the performance of
chief executive officers is often unrelated to their remuneration because CEOs
are an indirect form of governance who represent owners poorly, often failing
to influence employment contracts and management incentives or the monitoring
mechanisms in respect of both of these. In contrast to this Jensen and Murphy
assert the owner-investor advantages of private equity. For example, in private
equity governed firms, owner-managers have direct oversight over managers,
their compensation and its link to performance.
Private equity and investor value
Acquisition by private equity, whether a buy-in to an existing private business
or if a plc business is taken private, aims to unlock value for investors and the
fund managers themselves. The PEBM is principally financed through debt,
which is leveraged against company assets such as freehold property and pen-
sion schemes. The debt model secures up to 90 percent of a buyout by bor-
rowing from institutional investors (limited partners) who support a particular
private-equity fund. In contrast, fund managers (managing partners) put in only
a small percentage themselves. To support a portfolio company and secure its
debt, private-equity funds often disaggregate a business into an operating firm
and a property company with the operating company leasing back the property
on a contractual basis with the funds raised from property sales used to pay
back debt funding. In addition to this, private-equity owners sometimes raise
additional debt to finance dividend payments. A dividend recapitalization
occurs where a portfolio company borrows money to make a cash payment to
the private-equity fund which owns it. These payments are itemized on the bal-
ance sheet of the portfolio company as debt, that is, additional debt which pays
a dividend to owners and fund managers. This is unusual to say the least as
dividends are normally paid out of profits.
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How does the model create value?
The PEBM creates value for investors in four ways. One, a portfolio company –
a bundle of assets – can be disintegrated, separated, sold and ‘spun off’. Two,
the weight of debt leverage directs management to focus only on short-term
profits by unlocking valuable assets through sophisticated financial engineering
to generate a ‘free cash flow’. This drives management re-structuring and
unbundling prior to an ‘exit strategy’ that aims to realize an investment after
perhaps only five years. Three, private-equity funds often resent being referred
to as an employer, preferring to describe themselves as ‘active owners’ or an
‘asset class’. In the UK current legislation on the transfer of undertakings pro-
tection of employment (TUPE) regulations and the EU acquired rights directive
uphold this position, as private-equity buyouts are not classed as a change of
ownership that affects industrial relations. Active owners cannot unilaterally
change terms and conditions of employment without employee consent.
However, it is the choice of governance mechanisms favoured by the PEBM,
offering, for example, union free communication and consultation that exhibits
an orientation towards the management of employees that is substantively dif-
ferent to more traditional employers. This preference, and the absence of TUPE
protection with respect to employee consultation on a collective basis, sustains
a speed of action that gives private-equity owners first mover advantage.
Therein employee consent to changes in the contract of employment is implied
by dint of the fact that employees continue to work in and remain employed at
a portfolio firm. Four, private equity enjoys significant tax breaks that are
unavailable to plc firms which reinforce the value creating potential of private-
equity vehicles for investors behind the funds and the fund managers themselves.
Therefore, corporation tax from plc firms and income tax from employees in
effect subsidize private sector profits.
The current crisis, financialization and private equity
The PEBM needs to be located within a broader context of financialization.
This describes the dominance of the financial sector and how volatility therein
has the potential to disconnect and disrupt the business system. Under the influ-
ence of neo-liberal ideology, financial de-regulation, particularly in the USA and
UK, stimulated innovations in banking and lending models that transformed
the acquisition of firms and the operation of financial markets, but is now in
crisis. For example, private equity provides a model for governing portfolio
firms and manages loan models for acquisition of such firms from ‘shadow
banking’, which has emerged since the early 2000s. Based on low interest rates,
high leverage and rising asset values a securitized loan model enabled banks to
parcel up loans secured against property and sell them to raise ‘new capital’.
However, financial markets went into reverse in September 2008 and the dis-
tributional disconnects of the PEBM became starkly evident as the value of
many portfolio firms became lower than the loans that supported them, pushing
some firms into liquidation and others into severe downsizing mode. Severe as
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this current crisis is, it should not lead to neglect of the longer term disconnects
raised in the original Thompson article and extended here.
Manager and owner objectives: disconnects 
in historical perspective
Before returning to the current period, this section groups together and briefly
outlines historically significant studies on the nature of firm governance and the
connections between stakeholders. First, those studies that outline the condi-
tions that gave managers a quasi-independence from owners. Second, how
this in turn enabled management to become a quasi-independent stakeholder.
Third, how some studies consider the disconnection between owners and man-
agers can be ‘solved’ via more profit oriented governance mechanisms such as
shareholder capitalism and the PEBM.
Management as an institutionalized business class: disconnecting owners
Berle and Means (1932) identified the importance of the separation between
ownership by entrepreneurs and investors and control by management and the
implications of this for industrial capitalism. Coase (1937) observed that the
emergence of the telephone and telegraph reduced the cost of organizing within
the firm, but tended to increase the size of the firm. Operating more historically,
Chandler (1962, 1977, 1990) developed three empirically informed, institution-
ally sequential arguments. First, managerial organization develops in response
to business strategy, in particular the development of vertical integration.
Second, the emergence of capital-intensive, machine-based mass production in
a second industrial revolution in the late 19th century further increased the
scale, size and scope of the firm, standardizing production and the regulation
of jobs. Third, these arguments come together in the managerial capitalism the-
sis, which suggests that administrative structures and managerial coordination
replace the invisible hand of market forces as the core developmental and struc-
tural impetus behind modern business. Chandler’s argument is similar in scope
to the more polemic arguments developed by Galbraith (1952, 1967). Galbraith
argued that in most Western business systems firms are oligopolistic and there-
fore compete for market share not profit maximization. Within this management
had wrestled organizational power away from owners through institutional
developments such as vertical integration in production and pluralism in work-
place relations, and the associated bureaucratization of management func-
tions within the firm (Tsuk, 2005).
The objectives of the firm: disconnecting profit maximization
By the late 1950s theories of the firm began to observe behaviour that was
obvious: shareholders and owners, who fund a business, played virtually no part
in running a firm, but instead preferred to secure a reasonable or satisfactory
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level of dividend income, leaving managers to actually control discretionary
decision making. Under conditions of oligopoly or monopoly capitalism these
behavioural or institutional theories modified the objective of profit maximization
by hypothesizing that management discretion is more likely to further the interests
of senior managers subject to a dividend constraint. Thus, March and Simon
(1958) and Cyert and March (1964) argued that management behaviour was
rational but only to a point. That is, rationality is bounded and in practice
 management often opt for satisfactory solutions – satisficing rather than maxi-
mizing. Baumol (1959) argued that firms measure success through sales revenue
maximization where management seek to increase business size (now termed
growing market share) rather than profit maximization, and increase output
beyond the maximizing level in order to outperform the market (increase
market share) subject to a dividend constraint. This argument was further inde-
pendently refined by Marris (1964) and Williamson (1964). Marris argued that
the long-term growth of the firm is the main aim of management and that this
may move a firm beyond profit maximization in terms of prices and outputs.
In contrast to this, Williamson developed a thesis of ‘managerial discretion’ sug-
gesting that management could decide how to allocate earned profits, retaining
some profit to grow the size of departments, innovate new products and dis-
tribute remaining profit to shareholders. However, over the past 30 years a new
stream of theory has emerged which firmly places the interests of business own-
ers, investors and shareholders at the forefront of analysis.
‘New economic theory and ownership’: re-connecting owners 
and disconnecting the management class
Drawing on micro economics, new theorizations describe the firm as a nexus of
private contractual relationships subject to regulation by capital markets. The
broadly defined new economics contains several bodies of analysis which ratio-
nalize the emergence of owner interests such as shareholder capitalism and one of
its central features – the PEBM. As early as 1962 corporate managers were theo-
rized as ‘shareholder agents’ compelled to manage a firm in ways that maximize
the profits of their principals, to the exclusion of all other interests in the firm and
the community at large (Friedman, 1962: 132–7). By contrast, agency theory, like
behavioural and managerial theory, conceptualizes the firm as an organization
made up of groups who hold diverse and conflicting interests (Jensen, 2007;
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Owners, investors and shareholders (the principals)
seek profit maximization whereas managers (their agents) are likely to have
different priorities, for example, reputational success, job security, industry
profile and other perks. Agency theory predicts that firms will operate in the
interests of owners, and deliver investor and shareholder value, if owners and
investors can impose their priorities on management to develop a contractual
approach to management and investment returns. In effect this takes the form of
a partnership agreement between fund managers and professional institutional
investors. Instead of accepting the presence of residual loss, owners and investors
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such as private-equity fund managers can limit both managerial opportunism
(formerly satisficing and management discretion) and the countervailing interests
of non-shareholder stakeholders (formerly more inclusive distribution) through a
combination of incentives and monitoring mechanisms.
The private-equity business model and employment relations
What disconnection?
The theoretical argument developed herein suggests that business strategies and
approaches to corporate governance are, within contemporary capitalism,
dominated by investor and shareholder interests. In addition to this, accumula-
tion strategies associated with these interest groups, such as the PEBM, discon-
nect evaluation of employment relations as a practitioner concern and a broadly
defined academic discipline. This is the case because the PEBM is not readily
evaluated theoretically or empirically beyond its alleged efficiency bearing char-
acteristics, which are measured more or less exclusively in terms of investment
returns. Indeed, at firm level the ways in which business strategy and corporate
governance is informed and shaped by the PEBM, and how in turn this informs
and shapes approaches to employment relations, is unclear. Other than refer-
ences to the institutional configuration of the American and British business
system and the short-termism that this encourages, the broadly defined com-
munity of employment relations scholars appear to have ceded critical evalua-
tion of the distributional impact of the PEBM on the basis of first mover
advantage to those who articulate its efficiency credentials.
Corporate governance and employment relations under private equity
Theoretically and empirically businesses governed or potentially governed by
the PEBM are presented as exemplars of competitive success. This is the case
because the theory of efficient capital markets and the logic of private-equity
acquisition stimulate efficiency either in management action at the level of the
firm or in the market for corporate control. The attraction of private-equity funds
for investment practitioners and institutional investors is the comparatively high
rates of return which (prior to the recent credit crunch) averaged between 15 per-
cent and 20 percent compared to average returns of 6 percent for the FTSE all
share index (BVCA, 2008). These returns lead academic supporters and practi-
tioners to argue that businesses governed by private equity secure higher returns
for investors and shareholders, deliver higher productivity and create more jobs
than equivalent plc firms (Bacon et al., 2004; BVCA, 2008; Gilligan and Wright,
2008). In many cases the business model does secure the benefits identified in
these claims and the studies that support them. As Thompson (2003: 359) points
out, those who ply their trade by purveying ideas – academics, policy
entrepreneurs and consultants – have a vested interest in proclaiming the new and
representatives of each of the three purveyor groups argue that workers have
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nothing to fear from private-equity ownership. Gilligan and Wright (2008: 39)
survey studies of how private equity impacts on HRM and conclude that the
picture is mixed but not negative. Similarly, CIMBOR (2008) for the European
Venture Capital Association (EVCA) argue that across Europe private equity has
little impact on employee relations but on average increases employee earnings.
The Walker Report (2007) on disclosure and transparency in private equity pro-
posed a continuation of voluntary regulation and was therefore largely silent
on employment relations. However, below the survey method that the majority
of these studies employ, there is no theoretical evaluation of private equity or the
PEBM at business system level, firm level or workplace level other than references
to stock terms such as active ownership, rapid organizational change and
powerful management incentives. Indeed, an EU sponsored study found that the
financial success of private equity is the only focus of most studies. Therein returns
to internal stakeholders (investors and owners), is paramount, with a focus on
employees or change in workplace employment relations beyond the rubric of
these studies (Gottschalg, 2007). This first mover advantage makes it much harder
to argue that not everyone is a winner in these situations – so paraphrasing
Thompson (2003); how might employers find it more difficult to keep the employ-
ment relations side of the bargain?
First, at system level, what remains academically unstated is that the diffu-
sion of the PEBM and the growth of the private-equity sector is a competitive
driver behind the move to shareholder value as a key measure of corporate per-
formance. Theoretically this driver is the missing competitive and institutional
innovation identified as the limiting factor in the diffusion of shareholder
capitalism and its operational sustainability. O’Sullivan’s (2000: 2) historically
informed evaluation of contemporary developments in business strategy
demonstrates that, in order to sustain investor and owner interests in share-
holder capitalism, managerial practice must be exclusively re-aligned towards
owner-investor interests. But more significantly, it is necessary to legitimize this
for workers, employers and society. The PEBM creates and sustains investor
value but requires a ‘downsize and distribute’ approach to business strategy,
corporate governance and the management of employment relations. Agency
theory provides the economic justification for this, citing the ‘slack’ and waste-
ful spending under managerial discretion. This rationale legitimizes the extrac-
tion of value from a wide group of stakeholders, re-distributing it across a
narrower group of key private-equity fund managers and investors.
Across business systems the contentious efficiency claims of the PEBM are
perceived by some actors and institutions as socially inappropriate and there-
fore less legitimate. As Thompson (2003: 368) suggested, comparatively not all
developments are generalizable across different types of business systems but
trends in product and capital markets do make the world smaller and diminish
institutional distinctiveness. The global presence of private-equity funds is one
such trend that is currently testing forms of capital, patterns of corporate gov-
ernance and employment relations more patient than American and British
variants. Empirically, it is clear that private equity and the PEBM operate across
782 Work, employment and society Volume 23  Number 4  December 2009
the EU (see Watt, 2008: 550–53) but, empirically, many American and German
firms and the majority of those in other business systems remained wedded to
national variants of managerial capitalism on the Chandlerian model. So, while
some ‘capitalisms’ might be more disconnected than others, the movement
towards investor and shareholder capitalism at system level dictates that private
equity and its associated business model become significant actors across
different types of business systems.
However, diversification in ownership or governance regimes at firm level
and movement towards a market-focused investor-driven model of employment
relations will be mediated by the embeddedness of established practices.
Stakeholder business systems such as Germany and Japan do encounter foreign
and domestic diffusion of private-equity investment, but this engagement with
the PEBM must evolve incrementally from a defined and systematically embed-
ded starting point. Empirically, this engagement may result in hybrids that con-
tinue some emphasis on stakeholder approaches at firm level. However, at
system level measures of convergence, such as the financialization of change,
manifested primarily in the growing prominence of credit and private equity,
co-exist with national divergence in the impact of financialization at firm level.
Analytically this reinforces established arguments in the ‘converging divergencies’
thesis (Katz and Darbishire, 2000).
A second disconnect for employment relations centres on the efficiency-
based discourse of private equity. Key (self-) attributes associated with private
equity at firm level – active management, rapid organizational change and pow-
erful management incentives – appear to be sufficiently attractive to both prac-
titioners and academic supporters to induce a state of amnesia with respect
to the potential impacts on workers at the receiving end of these attributes.
Theoretically these attributes can deliver value for fund managers and investors,
but the actual and potential employment relations outcomes of each attribute
may have distributional as well as efficiency consequences for workers. In com-
parison to plc firms, those governed by the PEBM (around 8% of American and
British private-sector employment) have higher leverage, a shorter-term focus
and requirement to service debt before any exit, and are more likely to sell and
downsize assets (including business units and pension schemes) by around 10
percent (WEF, 2008). So while some survey sources praise the efficiency creden-
tials of private equity backed firms, the discipline of financialization at system
level conflicts with a longer term organizational focus on HRM at firm level.
The potential of a third disconnect requires critically informed empirical
evaluation. Firms governed by the PEBM re-connect investors and owners and
disconnect managerial discretion within its institutionalized business class where
managers built overstaffed empires, paid themselves too much for not very
much, and avoided conflict with workers, customers, suppliers and taxation
authorities. The hegemony of agency theory is unable to countenance the possi-
bility that owner-investor interests may generate inefficiency. A reliance on share
options and the promotion of share price growth may generate a bigger share of
value-added remuneration, but what is empirically less clear is that this may not
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be the same as an increase in value added activities. Similarly, re-directing returns
to managers, owners and investors and aligning the interests of employees
with these groups may validate agency approaches, yet the revenues now
accruing to these groups would have been reinvested or distributed to a wider
group of stakeholders. It may be the case empirically, and it is the case theoreti-
cally, that corporate governance on the basis of the PEBM has a significant
influence on the reciprocity of commitments between employer and employees
which in turn will have an impact on the effectiveness of HRM regimes. Thus, in
agency theory, re-connecting finance and corporate capital can disconnect
corporate strategy and HR policy in the manner captured in Thompson’s
argument that employers find it more difficult (even if they aim to) to keep their
side of the bargain as a result of developments in the financial circuit of capital.
Conclusions and theoretical reflections
This article does not question the attraction of the PEBM for investment prac-
titioners. What it does seek to highlight is the disconnection between the finan-
cial performance of private equity backed firms and the performance of the
business system as a series of integrated embedded institutions. This is the way
in which I develop the term disconnected capitalism from the position laid out
by Thompson (2003). My usage of the term highlights a disconnect between
employer objectives at the level of the firm and the shift to the imperative of
investor and shareholder value as a business system driver. This does not mean
that HR commentators who highlight the central significance of resource-
based approaches to the firm, or business partnership models for strategic
HRM, are wrong or in denial. However, the issue of financial performance,
now calibrated on the basis of investor and shareholder value at the level of
the business system rather than strategic choice in HRM at firm level, is not
integral to their analysis.
As with Thompson’s thesis, this article is not merely a critique. It seeks
to analyze a current development present in most business systems, not in the
form of a model building exercise but in terms of the disconnecting effects
that private equity and the PEBM have on established circuits of capital and
institutionally defined management and labour interests in national business
systems. For example, how much of the capital in the British business system
has to be owned by private equity before the variations in patterns of own-
ership, corporate governance and employment relations weaken the idea of a
British (based and owned) business system to the extent that the idea
becomes less workable as a methodology for research? Currently, less than
10 percent of British business is disconnected from the institutional routine
of the British business system. The argument presented here is incomplete – a
critically based systematic empirical evaluation of corporate governance and
employment relations under the PEBM is yet to be undertaken. Yet the fur-
ther disconnects highlighted here may expose key organizing concepts
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deployed by academics – the country of origin effect in international busi-
ness and comparative and international HRM. What nationality are these
firms; who actually owns them and within which corporate governance
regime are they registered and regulated?
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